Company profile
| Company | Tessera Systems (composite) |
|---|---|
| Business | Enterprise infrastructure software |
| Stage | Pre-IPO through public company |
| Markets | Home market, plus Europe, Asia Pacific and Latin America |
| Situation | International demand with no structure to serve it |
| Scope | Territory design, partner program, regional teams, pricing, forecasting, market-entry playbook |
Background
Tessera sold enterprise infrastructure software with strong adoption in its home market. Inquiries from outside it were growing and were handled by whoever answered the inbound message. No territory outside the home market belonged to anyone, no partner had signed terms, and no one at headquarters could say what international pipeline existed, what it would close, or what it cost to win.
Leadership’s question was not whether to expand. It was how to open each market without building a separate company in every country: a repeatable method to enter a market, staff it, source partners and report on it, so that each new market took less effort than the one before.
The challenge
| Measure | Starting point |
|---|---|
| Territories with a named owner outside the home market | 0 |
| Signed distribution agreements | 0 |
| Documented partner program | none |
| Marketing development funds (MDF) tied to pipeline | none |
| In-region sales, marketing and support staff | 0 |
| International pipeline visible to leadership | none |
| Regions with an operating framework | 0 of 3 |
Europe, Asia Pacific and Latin America were the markets that mattered, and each posed a different problem. Europe had the most demand and the most regulatory variation. Asia Pacific had a large number of small markets with different partner landscapes. Latin America had the least existing presence and the widest currency and pricing exposure. None had commercial infrastructure behind it.
Approach
1. Structure before headcount. Target markets were assessed for entry approach, partner landscape, regulatory environment and the infrastructure each would need. Territories and coverage models were then defined for each region, so every market had a named owner and a defined scope before anyone was hired into it. This sequence meant that the first hires inherited a defined role and not an open mandate.
2. Partners as the first route to market. Distribution agreements were sourced and negotiated with partners in all three regions, which put the company on a legal and commercial footing without establishing local entities. Agreement terms addressed exclusivity, territory scope, minimum performance and a defined exit, so that an underperforming partner could be replaced without litigation. A global partner program followed, covering terms, onboarding, enablement and an online partner portal.
3. Tie partner funding to pipeline. A marketing development funds program was built so that investment followed return. Funds were allocated against partner-sourced pipeline and closed business, and not on the strength of the relationship. In the first year this produced a visible difference between partners. Two generated most of the sourced pipeline and received most of the funding, and one that had expected a larger allocation on the basis of its size was moved to a performance-linked tier.
4. Staff regions where volume justified it. In Asia Pacific and Latin America, outsourced regional offices carried the first presence while volume was proven. Sales, marketing and pre- and post-sales support were then hired in region, and a Territory Sales Manager team was built and managed across Asia Pacific on a common operating framework, so each region reported on the same basis and the same measures.
5. Build pricing and operations for each region. Multi-currency pricing, international price lists and the operating framework behind them were established, so a deal in any region could be quoted, booked and supported without a custom exception. Currency exposure was the main design constraint in Latin America, and price lists were reviewed on a fixed cycle.
6. One forecast. An international forecast and pipeline cadence was set to the same standard as the home market, with common stage definitions, a review rhythm and leadership reporting. Partner-sourced pipeline became visible and attributable for the first time.
7. Document the method. Territory design, partner sourcing, team build and operational setup were captured in a market-entry playbook. The first region took the longest, and the second and third started from the playbook and moved faster.
Results
| Measure | Before | After |
|---|---|---|
| Territories with a named owner | 0 | all |
| Signed distribution agreements | 0 | agreements in all 3 regions |
| Partner program | none | terms, enablement, portal |
| MDF tied to pipeline | none | ROI-based allocation |
| In-region teams | 0 | sales, marketing and support in Asia Pacific and Latin America |
| International pipeline visible | none | by region, against target |
| Regions with an operating framework | 0 of 3 | 3 of 3 |
Revenue in Asia Pacific and Latin America grew 70% year over year for four consecutive years following the infrastructure build:
| Year after build | Revenue index (build year = 100) |
|---|---|
| 1 | 170 |
| 2 | 289 |
| 3 | 491 |
| 4 | 835 |
Partner-sourced pipeline became measurable, leading to funding decisions made on return. International revenue became visible against target for the first time, leading to leadership conversations grounded in one number across regions. The operating base was built ahead of the growth and carried the company through its public offering.
About this study
Illustrative: modeled scenario, not a client engagement. Tessera Systems is invented. The starting conditions are modeled on software companies expanding internationally. The 70% annual growth for four consecutive years and the distribution agreements across three regions correspond to results achieved in this work. The index values are arithmetic on that growth rate.